Pericles Should Learn to Fix a Leaky Pipe –  Why Trial Advocacy Should Become Part  of the LLB Curriculum (Part 1) by Gravett, Willem Hendrik




 It is a sad fact that at most university law schools in South Africa, a student can 
graduate without ever having set foot in a courtroom, and without ever having spoken 
to, or on behalf of, a person in need of advice or counsel. The past several years 
have witnessed a swelling chorus of complaints that the current LLB curriculum 
produces law graduates who were "out of their depth" in practice. My purpose is to 
make a case for the inclusion in the LLB curriculum of a course in trial advocacy. 
This endeavour of necessity invokes the broader debate over the educational 
objectives of a university law school – a debate memorably framed by William 
Twining as the two polar images of "Pericles and the plumber". My thesis is that the 
education of practising lawyers should be the primary mission of the university law 
school. The first part of this contribution is a response to those legal academics who 
hold that the role of the law school is to educate law students in the theories and 
substance of the law; that it is not to function as a trade school or a nursery school 
for legal practice. With reference to the development of legal education in the United 
States, I argue that the "education/training" dichotomy has been exposed as a red 
herring. This so-called antithesis is false, because it assumes that a vocational 
approach is necessarily incompatible with such values as free inquiry, intellectual 
rigour, independence of thought, and breadth of perspective. The modern American 
law school has shown that such so-called incompatibility is the product of intellectual 
snobbery and devoid of any substance. It is also often said that the raison d'être of 
a university legal education is to develop in the law student the ability "to think like a 
lawyer". However, what legal academics usually mean by "thinking like a lawyer" is 
the development of a limited subset of the skills that are of crucial importance in 
practising law: one fundamental cognitive skill – analysis – and one fundamental 
applied skill – legal research. We are not preparing our students for other, equally 
crucial lawyering tasks – negotiating, client counselling, witness interviewing and trial 
advocacy. Thinking like a lawyer is a much richer and more intricate process than 
merely collecting and manipulating doctrine. We cannot say that we are fulfilling our 
goal to teach students to "think like lawyers", because the complete lawyer "thinks" 
about doctrine and about trial strategy and about negotiation and about counselling. 
We cannot teach students to "think like lawyers" without simultaneously teaching 
them what lawyers do. An LLB curriculum that only produces graduates who can 
"think like lawyers" in the narrow sense ill-serves them, the profession and the public. 
If the profession is to improve the quality of the services it provides to the public, it 
is necessary for the law schools to recognise that their students must receive the 
skills needed to put into practice the knowledge and analytical abilities they learn in 
the substantive courses. We have an obligation to balance the LLB curriculum with 
courses in professional competence, including trial advocacy – courses that expose 
our students to what actually occurs in lawyer-client relationships and in courtrooms. 
The skills our law students would acquire in these courses are essential to 
graduating minimally-competent lawyers whom we can hand over to practice to 
complete their training. The university law school must help students form the habits 
and skills that will carry over to a lifetime of practice. Nothing could be more absurd 
than to neglect in education those practical matters that are necessary for a person's 
future calling. 
Keywords 
Trial advocacy; legal skills; legal education; LLB curriculum 
…………………………………………………….  
Pericles Should Learn to Fix a Leaky Pipe –  
Why Trial Advocacy Should Become Part  
of the LLB Curriculum (Part 1) 
WH Gravett* 
 
Pioneer in peer-reviewed,  
open access online law publications 
Author 
Willem H Gravett 
Affiliation 
University of Pretoria 
South Africa 
Email willem.gravett@up.ac.za 
Date of submission 
9 June 2017 
Date published  
22 January 2018 
Editor Dr A Gildenhuys 
How to cite this article   
Gravett WH "Pericles Should Learn 
to Fix a Leaky Pipe – Why Trial 
Advocacy Should Become Part of 
the LLB Curriculum (Part 1) 








WH GRAVETT PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  2 
In the last analysis, the law is what the lawyers are. 
And the law and lawyers are what the law schools make them.1 
1 Introduction 
Imagine a medical student graduating from university without ever having set 
foot in a hospital, and without ever having spoken to or examined a patient. 
It is almost too ludicrous to contemplate. Yet, it is a sad fact that at most 
university law schools in South Africa, a student can graduate without ever 
having set foot in a courtroom, and without ever having spoken to, or on 
behalf of, a person in need of advice or counsel.2 We in legal academia 
apparently expect our students to gain the clinical skills of lawyering 
elsewhere, presumably in the hurly-burly of practice. 
The past several years have witnessed a swelling chorus of complaints that 
the current LLB curriculum produces law graduates who were "out of their 
depth" in practice.3 In 2016 the Council on Higher Education (CHE) undertook 
an evaluation of the LLB programmes at all the South African law faculties in 
accordance with the national standards set for the LLB degree. Legal 
education is again in a period of flux and introspection. It is also a time of 
opportunity and potential. 
Against the background of the renewed focus on the LLB curriculum, my 
purpose is to make a case for the inclusion in that curriculum of a course in 
trial advocacy. This endeavour of necessity invokes the broader debate over 
the educational objectives of a university law school – a debate memorably 
framed by William Twining, "for the sake of alliteration", as the two polar 
images of "Pericles and the plumber".4 The image of the lawyer as plumber:5 
[I]s essentially someone who is master of certain specialised knowledge, 'the 
law', and certain technical skills. What he needs is a no-nonsense specialised 
                                            
1  Felix Frankfurter as quoted in Edwards 1992 Mich L Rev 34. 
* Willem H. Gravett. BLC LLB (UP) LLM (Notre Dame) LLD (UP). Senior Lecturer, 
Department of Procedural Law, University of Pretoria. Email: 
willem.gravett@up.ac.za. 
2  At the University of Johannesburg, undergraduates apparently have to do compulsory 
work at the law clinic. O'Brien Date Unknown http://sastudy.co.za/article/uj-law-
graduates-better-prepared-for-work/. At other institutions, work in the law clinic 
constitutes part of a final year elective course. There are also many universities in 
South Africa that do not have the resources to even operate a law clinic. 
3  See, for example, comments by Judge Achmat Jappie: Jappie 2012 
http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=20120730085518253. 
4  Twining 1967 LQR 396-426. Also see generally Campbell 2014 Stell LR 15-33. 
5  Twining 1967 LQR 397. 
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training to make him a competent technician. A 'liberal' education in law for such 
a functionary is at best wasteful; at worst it can be dangerous. 
At the other extreme is the image of the lawyer as Pericles – "the law-giver, 
the enlightened policy-maker, the wise judge".6 
Let me state my position clearly at the outset: I fully support Richard Posner 
– a United States Federal Judge and a leading legal scholar – that the 
education of practising lawyers is, or at least should be, the primary mission 
of the university law school.7 The first part of this article is a response to those 
legal academics who take a different position, and who renounce law 
teaching as an endeavor is pursuit of professional education.8 
2 What should the educational objectives of the university 
law school be? 
One of the central questions with regard to restructuring the LLB degree is 
whether it should be designed for no-nonsense, technically competent 
plumbers, or for liberally-educated Periclean thinkers, or for something in 
between?9 
Judges, practitioners, the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) and the 
General Council of the Bar have universally expressed grave concern over 
the obvious inability of law school graduates to transition from the study of 
law to the practice of law.10 For example, in 2012 the Professional Provident 
Society (PPS) conducted a survey that indicated that "out of 500 attorneys 
surveyed … only 21% believed [that] the current LLB-degree sufficiently 
prepares prospective legal practitioners to succeed in the profession".11 
During the LLB Summit in May 2009, the late Nic Swart, chief executive 
officer of LSSA and LEAD,12 stated that the legal profession requires lawyers 
with the skills to apply the law, who are ethical, who understand the pressures 
of the profession, and who understand what is necessary to manage a 
                                            
6  Twining 1967 LQR 398. 
7  Posner 1981 Yale L J 1129. Joel Modiri calls this assumption "problematic". Modiri 
2013 Stell LR 460. 
8  See Edwards 1992 Mich L Rev 41. 
9  Brownsword 1996 Law Teacher 1. 
10  For a summary of the criticisms of the LLB degree by various stakeholders, see Louw 
and Broodryk 2016 Stell LR 535-536; Singo 2016 Stell LR 554. 
11  As quoted in Louw and Broodryk 2016 Stell LR 535. 
12  The Legal Education and Development department of LSSA. 
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successful law practice.13 In short, "we should have [an LLB] that gives us 
value".14 
However, recent scholarship rejects these expressions by the profession of 
the urgent need for competent, clinically trained law graduates. These 
scholars – who associate with the heterodox Critical Legal Studies (CLS) 
movement and who are all currently or were formerly affiliated with the 
department of jurisprudence at the faculty of law of the University of Pretoria 
(hence I refer to them as the "Pretoria Crits") – seem to suggest that the 
fundamental purpose of the university law school is to educate the lawyer as 
Pericles.15 
2.1 The Pretoria Crit vision for critical "legal" education16 
The unifying theme of the Pretoria Crits' prolific scholarship is that critical 
legal theory is the elixir for all that ails legal education in South Africa. For 
example, Joel Modiri17 claims that what is needed in response to the crisis in 
legal education is a "critical legal education, or an approach to the study and 
teaching of law grounded in a critical jurisprudence". Indeed, the Pretoria 
Crits believe that critical legal theory must be the "substantive pillar" of legal 
education.18 Emile Zitzke19 provides the clearest articulation of what this 
would entail, when he calls for teaching the law of delict (and, presumably, 
by extension every other substantive course in the LLB curriculum) "critically", 
as a response to our "conservative legal culture". By "critical" he means in 
"compliance with broad themes of critical legal theory", especially drawing 
from "Critical Legal Studies ... and its successive theoretical progeny 
(Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Race Theory and Queer Theory)".20 Modiri21 
                                            
13  Sedutla 2013 De Rebus 9. 
14  Quoted in Sedutla 2013 De Rebus 9. 
15  Madlingozi 2006 Pulp Fictions 5-24; Van Marle 2010 SALJ 628-645; Van Marle and 
Modiri 2012 SALJ 209-219; Modiri 2013 Stell L Rev 455-479; Modiri 2014 Acta 
Academia 1-24; Van Marle 2014 Acta Academia 196-215; Zitzke 2014 Acta Academia 
52-76; Modiri 2016 Stell LR 507-534. 
16  Elsewhere I have argued that the Pretoria Crits' radical political agenda within the law 
school is only superficially directed at the LLB curriculum. Their true ambition is 
revolution, not reform. They not only aim at the "deconstruction" of the South African 
legal system, but at its "destruction". Their "jurisprudence" is at its core "anti-law". See 
Gravett 2018 SALJ (forthcoming).  
17  Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 1. Van Marle and Modiri 2012 SALJ 212 suggest that the 
"four-year LLB must be critically evaluated … at present it does not sufficiently provide 
opportunities for critical thinking/acquisition of skills …". 
18  Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 10. 
19  Zitzke 2014 Acta Academia 55. 
20  Zitzke 2014 Acta Academia 55. 
21  Modiri 2013 Stell LR 473. 
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likewise states that legal education "must be grounded in theory" (by which 
of course he means critical legal theory). 
The Pretoria Crits charge the "bureaucratic powers in the judiciary and the 
legal profession" with being "staggeringly unimaginative and myopic" in their 
understanding about what the teaching of law should entail.22 As a result, 
asserts Modiri,23 we have been left with law faculties: 
[W]hose intellectual, knowledge-producing and thinking functions have been 
usurped by the demands of the corporate legal profession and by a functionalist 
preoccupation with 'practical,' 'hard law', 'real-world' issues and activities which 
are deemed more relevant than the 'theoretical' or 'soft-law' ones. 
The Pretoria Crits argue that "the value of legal education should not be 
indexed by how well it serves the needs and expectations of the legal 
profession and the judiciary".24 According to the Pretoria Crits:25 
[L]aw faculties … all over the country are being browbeaten, successfully it 
would seem, by the General Bar Council and the South African Law Society 'to 
produce graduates who are ready for the professions' … At every turn we are 
being told that we have to teach students in a manner that will enable them to 
'hit the ground running' when they complete their studies. 
The Pretoria Crits conceive of the crisis in legal education "as mainly 
jurisprudential".26 Of course, it is always tempting to conclude that the thing 
we are most confident we can do is the thing that is most important to be 
done.27 The Pretoria Crits view the problem in jurisprudential terms, because 
jurisprudence is all they know. They reject the demands of the profession for 
an LLB curriculum that is relevant and adds value, because they are ignorant 
– and proudly so – of the demands of law practice. 
                                            
22  Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 3. 
23  Modiri 2013 Stell LR 463. 
24  Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 1. 
25  Madlingozi 2006 Pulp Fictions 17. 
26  Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 4. In fact, they see a multitude of crises that are 
"themselves a confluence of the violence and disciplinarity of the law, the 
conservatism of our formalist legal culture, the disenchantment of law students and 
teachers, the neoliberalisation of knowledge, the corporatisation of the university, the 
erosion of an active, democratic, public sphere, the maintenance and legitimation of 
inequality, misery and powerlessness, and the deeply entrenched supremacy of 
Western epistemological paradigms". Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 19. The problems 
at the heart of the crisis in legal education include "the racialised, gendered and 
Eurocentric order of knowledge that still subsists in most curricula; the problem of 
institutional racism and lack of transformation, and the rising corporatisation and 
privatisation of higher education, to name a few". Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 18. 
27  Keeton 1981 Md L Rev 222. 
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It is trite that the law school that ignores, or worse yet, contemptuously rejects 
the demands of practice is the law school that will quickly become obscure 
and irrelevant. Such a law school will serve the needs of only a handful of 
students who intend to pursue an academic career in legal theory, and ignore 
the hundreds who come to law school to receive a legal education. In her 
inaugural address on 11 May 2004, Caroline Nicholson28 encapsulated the 
essential symbiosis between university law school, law students and the legal 
profession: 
The objective of Law Faculties and Schools is to produce graduates suited to 
the role of legal professionals. They have an obligation therefore, not only to 
meet the needs and expectations of their learners but of the profession too. For 
this reason it is essential that legal academics be aware of what learners want 
and need, and marry that with the wants and needs of the profession. 
The Pretoria Crits seem to be consumed by an almost insalubrious obsession 
to establish university legal studies as a purely academic intellectual pursuit 
akin to humanities studies. They insist that a critical legal education is 
"inseparab[le] … from a conception of law as a humanities discipline".29 They 
lament the fact that "none of the major political currents dominating the social 
sciences and humanities and public discourse have led to a meaningful 
revision of how we teach law and how we structure the LLB curriculum".30 
The Pretoria Crits' (mis)conception of law as a humanities discipline leads 
them to pursue an academic agenda that seeks a severance of legal 
education from the mainstream of the legal profession. Thus, they draw a 
sharp distinction between "education" (the main tent) and "training" (the side-
show).31 "Practical training", claims Karin van Marle,32 is apparently what our 
students should undergo after graduation, and is "… separate from the 
education we as academics should be giving them". Thus, according to Van 
Marle's classification "academics" should "educate", while "practitioners" 
                                            
28  Ironically, as head of the department of jurisprudence at the University of Pretoria 
faculty of law. As quoted in Madlingozi 2006 Pulp Fictions 15. 
29  Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 15, 19; Modiri 2013 Stell LR 475. 
30  Modiri 2016 Stell LR 508-509. The Pretoria Crits make no secret of their ultimate 
objective. They state emphatically that their effort to "apprehend law as a humanities 
discipline" is also an effort to "distinguish or distance law and legal study from [the] 
typical styles of legal inquiry and pedagogy …". Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 16-17. 
Modiri describes his perception of the "three currently typical styles of legal inquiry and 
pedagogy, namely the doctrinal approach, the scientific approach and the 
business/corporatist approach". Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 16-17. 
31  Van Marle 2010 SALJ 643-644. 
32  Van Marle 2010 SALJ 644. Van Marle advocates that we should "giv[e] students the 
freedom to be educated, to pursue academically multiple possibilities without too 
quickly, prematurely limiting them to the realities of practice". Van Marle 2010 SALJ 
644. 
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should "train". Could Van Marle make this argument concerning any other 
professional school? Would she entrust her own well-being to an engineer, 
an architect or a physician who had not been "trained" in professional 
competencies while at university?33 
Moreover, the Pretoria Crits are committed to the pursuit of knowledge and 
free inquiry all for their own sake, as having an intrinsic value, as being a 
valuable end in itself.34 They accuse the majority of legal academics as 
having an institutional commitment only to wealth creation, to training people 
so that they can perform more valuable roles in an expanding modern 
economy.35 What the Pretoria Crits propose is that we give our law students 
"the freedom to be educated, to pursue academically multiple possibilities 
without too quickly, prematurely limiting them to the realities of practice".36 
Although admirable in concept, it is completely devoid of any reality in the 
South African context. As evidenced by the shortening of the LLB to a four 
year degree in response to social need and economic reality, there is limited 
time that can be allocated to law students pursuing a broad-based liberal 
education, similar to that which law students in the United States have the 
luxury to engage in before commencing law studies. It ill-behooves the 
university law school in South Africa, with the present day costs of legal 
education, both in terms of money and time, to suggest to students that they 
should wait until after graduation to learn to be a lawyer. Potential students 
will simply come to look upon law school as irrelevant because it fails to gird 
its graduates for practice. 
The Pretoria Crits' perfidious agenda of attempting to recast law as a 
humanities discipline would only result in future generations of "lawyers" 
being well-trained in legal theory, but ill-equipped in dealing with practical 
matters upon their entry into practice.37 Consider, for example, the Pretoria 
Crits' view on "legal" writing. They look toward the "broad humanities" to shed 
"another light and a value of a different kind on language, reading, writing and 
thinking".38 Modiri39 writes: 
                                            
33  See Lubet 1989-1990 Cornell L Rev 955. 
34  Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 3. 
35  Brownsword 1996 Law Teacher 5. 
36  Van Marle 2010 SALJ 644. The Pretoria Crits insist upon "the intrinsic value of 
knowledge, education, literature and theory as a means of living in, and illuminating 
the many worlds, spaces and contexts we inhabit". Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 3. 
37  Burger 1980-1981 Fordham L Rev 3. 
38  Van Marle 2014 Acta Academia 209. 
39  Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 17. 
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[H]umanities-inflected approaches to … legal education adopt a more 
expansive and imaginative conception of what 'reading' entails and what a legal 
'text' is; it thinks and writes in ways that are non- or even anti-scientific, 
suspending science … and … reject[ing] the annexation of law to the priorities 
of economics and business. 
To Tshepo Madlingozi's mind, "reading and writing are more than just 
professional skills, but should be conceived of as attributes of an 
emancipated and imaginative self".40 Students should be exposed to "more 
than just cases, text books and journal articles, but also [to] novels and 
poems".41 
Thus, a renewed emphasis on writing skills in the new LLB curriculum should 
focus on more than "the strength of the legal research and argument" in 
"office memorandums, letters, heads of argument, contracts, and many other 
legal documents" that our students will draft in practice.42 By "writing", so Van 
Marle's43 argument goes: 
[W]e should mean something more than to compile legal documents; writing 
should go beyond mere functionality or economic gain … One reason to start 
and keep writing is to respond to, and engage with the hardness of life, the 
disenchantment of the world, the loss of the ideal of justice. 
I can understand that it is salutary, even admirable, to write about these 
things, but I fail to see their relevance to "writing" in the context of a legal 
education. As most practitioners understand, judges generally prefer lawyers 
who get to the point. Most cases are resolved on their facts, and the few that 
do present actual issues of law seldom require extended forays into the 
"disenchantment of the world". 
There is a crucial distinction between the legal writing that the university law 
school should teach, and the kind of writing exalted by the Pretoria Crits. A 
work of philosophy or science can be good, even great, without wide 
acceptance. Legal writing (in whatever form), however, can never be good if 
it fails to persuade. In Aristotelean terms, a rhetorical argument that fails to 
persuade is perforce a poor argument.44 In legal writing, persuasion is the 
only test that counts. Literary style, massive displays of scholarship, catchy 
phrases, erudition, enlightenment, learning and wisdom are all pointless if the 
                                            
40  Modiri 2016 Stell LR 527. 
41  Modiri 2016 Stell LR 527. Writing thus encompasses "thinking and reflection and this 
would mean writing assessments should not be limited to drafting office 
memorandums or heads of arguments but also essays and journals". Modiri 2016 Stell 
LR 528. 
42  Van Marle 2014 Acta Academia 209-210. 
43  Van Marle 2014 Acta Academia 210. 
44  Aristotle "Rhetoric Book I Chapter 3". 
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writing does not persuade.45 Persuasive legal writing is what we should teach 
law students, along with proficiency in legal analysis, legal reasoning, legal 
argument and legal synthesis. 
The fallacies inherent in the Pretoria Crit view of legal education are almost 
too glaring to merit articulation. Most obviously, viewing law schools as purely 
academic institutions that should focus exclusively on intellectualism, would 
leave a gaping hole in the education of lawyers. But that, I contend, is exactly 
the Pretoria Crits' goal. For the Pretoria Crits, the first purpose of a law school 
is to produce "citizens", "activists", "critical thinkers" and "intellectuals".46 The 
first duty of the law professor is, according to the United States CLS scholar, 
Duncan Kennedy, to "radicalise" the law students, ie, to re-direct them 
towards neo-Marxism.47 
The Pretoria Crits have no interest in training lawyers.48 They too much 
admire their humanities counterparts and view anything but theory as 
"unworthy". They apparently look down upon the practice of law as several 
cuts below plumbers in both the intellectual challenge and the moral utility of 
their work.49 Law, as the collective means by which we maintain social order 
through rules and processes for resolving disputes, has somehow come to 
seem unworthy of serious academic attention.50 
Thus, it serves the Pretoria Crits' agenda to insulate our law students from 
contact with the law as a practical craft – the active doing of the lawyer's task 
– and replace it with theoretical abstractions. That is why they insist that the 
central focus of legal education should not be on "fixing and solving" legal 
problems, but on abstract theorising – "exploring, questioning, and 
transgressing fixed frameworks".51 
However, as any practicing lawyer knows, theorising has never solved 
anything. It is only when theory is combined with doing – the ability to use the 
law and legal process – that change comes about. As Jerome Frank 
reminded American lawyers in a famous dissent: "A legal system is not what 
it says, but what it does ... It is the substantive rule only as it trickles through 
                                            
45  See Lubet 1997 U Ill L Rev 203. 
46  Modiri 2014 Acta Academia 16; Van Marle and Modiri 2012 SALJ 211. 
47  Schwartz 1985 J Leg Ed 20. A US Crit has described Kennedy as a "cross between 
Rasputin and Billy Graham. Machiavellian … with the seductiveness of a revivalist 
preacher … Kennedy wants your soul". Schlegel 1984 Stanford L Rev 392. 
48  For elaboration on this point, see Gravett 2018 SALJ (forthcoming). 
49  Ayer 1993 Mich L Rev 2150-2151. 
50  Ayer 1993 Mich L Rev 2157. 
51  Modiri 2016 Stell LR 529. 
WH GRAVETT PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  10 
the screen of action – which counts in life".52 Practising law consists of 
thought and action. 
Legal problems require solutions. A client facing "imprisonment or poverty or 
a ruined life"53 usually does not need a lawyer to critically deconstruct her 
problem. What the client is looking for is not insights into "critical legal studies, 
feminist legal theory, critical race theory and queer theory".54 The client needs 
a lawyer to help her "make repairs or salvage some of the wreckage".55 
Clients need practitioners, not philosophers or pedagogues. That this 
observation might annoy some in legal academia is a risk worth taking to 
encourage a renewed appraisal of the need for skills training in the LLB 
curriculum. It is trite that law has significance only in relation to the underlying 
human problems that it is able to solve. Legal education can be truly relevant 
only if it produces law students who are equipped with transferable 
intellectual skills that they can then use in socially constructive endeavours. 
Thus, legal education must develop the skills of legal writing, negotiating, oral 
advocacy, as well as purely intellectual skills. The simple fact is that without 
skills training the lawyer is only partially qualified – and indeed ill-qualified – 
to protect clients' interests.56 In Karl Llewellyn's57 words: 
Technique without ideals may be a menace, but ideals without technique are a 
mess; and to turn ideals into effective vision, in matters of law, calls for passing 
those ideals through a hard-headed screen of effective legal technique … It is 
for the practice of law that we are to train. 
The simple fact – and the fundamental flaw at the heart of the Pretoria Crits' 
argument – is that no amount of pie-in-the-sky theorising could morph law 
into yet another discipline in the faculty of humanities. They refuse to see the 
law school for what it is – a professional school situated in a university, similar 
to schools of engineering, medicine, management, and accountancy. This 
means that university law schools have a dual character inasmuch as they 
are both academic and professional. Law schools treasure their university 
base and its ties to traditions and inquiry. At the same time, they conceive it 
                                            
52  United States v Antonelli Fireworks Co 155 F2d 631, 662 (2d Cir 1946) (Frank J, 
dissenting). 
53  Frank 1947 Yale L J 1310. 
54  Frank 1947 Yale L J 1310. 
55  Asper 1965 Md L Rev 285. 
56  See generally Burger 1967-1968 Washburn L J 19. 
57  Llewellyn Jurisprudence 346. 
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as one of their missions to contribute to the preparation of students who 
expect to be practising lawyers.58 
2.2 The "education/training" dichotomy is a red herring 
I take note of the criticism by Stuart Woolman et al59 of Zyiad Motala's 
suggestion to incorporate legal research and writing courses into the LLB, 
based upon the first-year writing courses found in law schools in the United 
States. It is indeed so that "South Africa is not the United States", but that 
does not mean that we have nothing to learn from the United States legal 
academic model. In the United States the "education/training" dichotomy has 
been exposed as a red herring. 
Commencing as pure apprenticeship training in law offices in the tradition of 
medieval crafts guilds,60 legal education in the United States underwent a 
revolution and became firmly established as a university discipline when "that 
brilliant neurotic", Christopher Columbus Langdell, became dean of Harvard 
Law School in 1870.61 To Langdell, the experience of the practising lawyer, 
in his office, with clients and in the courtroom, were improper materials for 
the law teacher and his student.62 Langdell's teaching philosophy can be 
summarised as follows:63 
First that law is a science; second that all the available materials of that science 
are contained in printed books.' This second proposition … was 'intended to 
exclude the traditional methods of learning law by work in a lawyer's office, or 
attendance upon the proceedings of courts of justice' … 'What qualifies a 
person to teach law', wrote Langdell, 'is not experience in the work of a lawyer's 
office, not experience in dealing with men, not experience in the trial or 
argument of causes, not experience, in short, in using law, but experience in 
learning … 
This factitious divorce between "law in books" and "law in action" prevailed 
for a century. United States legal academics were finally rattled out of their 
elitist intellectual complacency by Chief Justice Warren E Burger in the 
Sonnett Lecture delivered on 26 November 1973 at Fordham University. In 
his forthright clarion call for better trained lawyers, Burger64 observed that: 
                                            
58  Keeton 1981 Md L Rev 203. 
59  Woolman, Watson and Smith 1997 SALJ 44-46; Motala 1996 SALJ 695. 
60  Burger 1980-1981 Fordham L Rev 1. 
61  Frank 1947 Yale L J 1303. 
62  Frank 1947 Yale L J 1303-1304. 
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We are more casual about qualifying the people we allow to act as advocates 
in the courtrooms than we are about licensing our electricians … This a curious 
aspect of a system that prides itself on the high place it accords to the judicial 
process in vindicating peoples' rights. 
Burger argued that law schools were not sufficiently emphasising 
professional ethics, manners and etiquette, which are essential to the 
lawyer's basic function, and that law schools were failing to provide adequate 
and systematic programmes by which students could focus on the 
elementary skills of advocacy.65 Bar associations and the profession 
obviously had a role to play in the trial advocacy training of young 
practitioners, but the Chief Justice's message was clear – law school is where 
the groundwork must be laid.66 
Predictably, the law schools, steeped in their Langdellian bookishness, did 
not eagerly embrace the idea of teaching trial advocacy – and the more elite 
the law school, the less enthusiastic it appeared.67 "We are not running a 
trade school", was the common refrain from law deans and legal 
academics.68 However, the criticism of the bench and the persistence of the 
American Bar Association (ABA) bore fruit. In 1987 an ABA report prepared 
under the direction of leading educators, practitioners and judges proclaimed 
that "professional skills training had become a standard part of the law school 
curriculum".69 Moreover, specifically with regard to the objectives of legal 
education, "training for competence [was] placed as the second major 
objective immediately after training in analytical skills".70 
Today, there is no longer even a debate over whether law schools should 
teach advocacy skills.71 United States law schools have at long last 
discovered that, although the conceptual skills traditionally stressed in their 
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curricula are necessary, they were certainly not sufficient to produce practice-
competent graduates.72 The basic trial advocacy course, "combin[ing] 
analytical skills with persuasive techniques", has become an integral and 
permanent part of the curricula of virtually every accredited law school in the 
United States, including those of all of the so-called "elite intellectual law 
schools" (Yale, Harvard, Stanford, Columbia, New York University and 
others) that produce the vast majority of legal academics in the United 
States.73 
Thirty years ago, United States law schools came to a realisation that the 
Pretoria Crits fail, or, more likely refuse, to grasp: Theoretical and practical 
training are not incompatible. Skills education does not entail training only in 
the performance of specific tasks. Clinical problem solving is in essence a 
complementary means by which an expanded set of analytical skills can be 
developed, expressed and evaluated.74 
William Twining also identified the false antithesis between the "lawyer as 
Pericles" and the "lawyer as plumber", between "academic" and "practical", 
"theory" and "practice", "liberal" and "vocational", as the Achilles heel of legal 
education in the United Kingdom.75 This so-called antithesis is false, because 
it assumes that a vocational approach is necessarily incompatible with such 
values as free inquiry, intellectual rigour, independence of thought, and 
breadth of perspective. As Twining also pointed out, the modern American 
law school – especially the "elite" institutions on the eastern seaboard – has 
shown that such so-called incompatibility was the product of intellectual 
snobbery, and devoid of any substance.76 
The false "education/training" dissension that the Pretoria Crits attempt to 
advance, results in a fractionalised conception of legal education as a system 
of diverse and conflicting educative elements. The tension implicit in this 
division has caused the Pretoria Crits to stress the importance of their radical 
brand of critical legal theory over all other elements of legal education. 
However, there is no one educative keystone in legal education.77 Legal 
education is one dynamic, a spectrum consisting of a broad sequence of 
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related and dependent qualities.78 It is a whole, an interweaving of the 
theoretical, the doctrinal, and the practical.79 
Why can so-called "vocational training" in law not be left exclusively to 
practice? As Twining80 put it: 
Experience is often potentially the best teacher, but unaided the man of action 
is not always an equally good learner. In respect of such matters, legal 
educators could probably learn much from the Armed Forces, the medical 
schools and from those involved in industrial training, perhaps even from those 
connected with the training of real plumbers. 
2.3 What does it mean "to think like a lawyer"? 
Most legal academics would agree that the purpose of law school is not to 
amass and master an enormous body of detailed substantive law. Even if it 
were possible for students to acquire such a mass of information, what would 
be the point? The constantly evolving nature of the law, as evidenced by the 
sheer volume of case law and statutory authority that are published annually 
in ever increasing frequency, means that black letter law does not keep any 
better than fish.81 
It is often stated that the raison d'être of a university legal education lies in a 
set of analytical skills that our students would (hopefully) master during law 
school – a set of transferable intellectual skills – that would then serve them 
in good stead throughout their professional careers.82 Thus, it is often said 
that the law school's primary obligation is, succinctly put, to develop in the 
law student the ability "to think like a lawyer".83 
However, what legal academics usually mean by the phrase "to think like a 
lawyer" – the development of analytical ability in examining mostly upper 
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court opinions, distinguishing cases, and construing or criticising legal 
doctrine – only develops a narrow intellectual quality. As one American legal 
scholar put it: "Law schools are like McDonalds: They do what they do … 
well, but they don't do very many things".84 University law schools focus 
almost exclusively on a limited subset of the skills that are of crucial 
importance in practising law: one fundamental cognitive skill – analysis – and 
one fundamental applied skill – legal research.85 We are not preparing our 
students for other, equally crucial lawyering tasks – negotiating, client 
counselling, witness interviewing and trial advocacy.86 Jerome Frank87 asks 
pointedly: 
University law teaching ... is supposed to teach [students] what they are to do 
in court-rooms and law offices. What the students see is a reflection in a badly-
made mirror of a reflection in a badly-made mirror of what is going on in the 
work-a-day life of lawyers. Why not smash the mirrors? … Why … does what 
we teach as 'law' so little resemble 'law' as practiced? 
Thinking like a lawyer is a "much richer and more intricate process" than 
merely collecting and manipulating doctrine.88 We cannot say that we are 
fulfilling our goal to teach students to "think like lawyers", because the 
complete lawyer "thinks" about doctrine and about trial strategy and about 
negotiation and about counseling.89 The complete lawyer possesses many 
other skills necessary for competent lawyering. Frank90 argued that "[t]he 
[l]aw student should learn, while in school, the art of legal practice". That 
means that our university law schools should "boldly, not shyly or evasively"91 
teach law students how to negotiate, how to try cases, and how to work with 
clients. 
Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that university law schools succeed 
completely in their aim of teaching students to "think like lawyers", the fact 
that law students spend four or five years92 with us, while we teach them 
nothing, or precious little, of what it means to "act like a lawyer" is profligate.93 
While law students must develop superior analytical skills and a fundamental 
understanding of the law, they must also learn – in the law school setting – to 
                                            
84  Bayless Manning as quoted in Pirie 1987 J Leg Ed 577. 
85  Cramton 1982 J Leg Ed 327. 
86  Cramton 1981 U Ark Little Rock L Rev 7. 
87  Frank 1947 Yale L J 1312. 
88  Frank 1947 Yale L J 1312. 
89  Edwards 1992 Mich L Rev 58. 
90  Jerome Frank as quoted in Stevens Law School 156. 
91  Jerome Frank as quoted in Stevens Law School 156. 
92  Depending on the students' course of study (LLB or BA/BCom LLB) and assuming, of 
course, students graduate on time. 
93  See Clare 1975-1976 St John's L Rev 463. 
WH GRAVETT PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  16 
put these skills to work.94 An LLB curriculum that only produces graduates 
who can "think like lawyers" in the narrow sense, ill-serves them, the 
profession and the public.95 Students cannot learn to think properly as 
lawyers unless they understand what makes a legal advocate competent.96 
We cannot really teach students to think like lawyers without simultaneously 
teaching them what lawyers do.97 
The so-called dichotomy in legal academic circles between "skills" and 
"substance", between "education" and "training", should be banished from 
our thinking. Contrary to what the Pretoria Crits would have us believe, 
university law schools do not have to choose between teaching law as an 
intellectual discipline and teaching skills. We can do both, and each can 
enrich the other.98 
The university law school is neither an ivory tower nor an assembly line.99 
Clearly, a combination of the practical and theoretical approaches is required; 
an LLB curriculum consisting of both traditional legal study intertwined with 
ample opportunity for clinical coursework. The university law school must 
introduce students to lawyering in all its dimensions.100 The goal of the 
university law school should be nothing less than producing young lawyers 
who can combine intellectual and performance demands, stand on their own 
feet and competently serve the public.101 
2.4 "Skills" is not a dirty word 
The Pretoria Crits' we-are-not-running-a-trade-school-mentality evinces their 
scholarly esotericism and intellectual elitism. But "skills" is not a dirty word in 
the context of a university legal education.102 Of course, the word "skills" is 
subject to many interpretations. I use "skills training" not in the sense of 
courses that teach students how to act or where the court is. In addition to 
teaching law students trial advocacy skills, techniques of written and oral 
persuasion, the practical aspects of lawyering – negotiating, interviewing, 
counselling – skills courses in the LLB must be designed to demonstrate the 
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importance of legal research, the analysis of facts within the framework of the 
law, a general facility with words, and the moulding of a solution to meet the 
needs of a client. No legal academic of whom I am aware has any interest in 
a course that teaches students how to be plumbers. 
The value of skills courses is apparent to both law students and practitioners. 
Final-year LLB students with whom I speak are almost universally 
enthusiastic about their clinical experience, most often describing it as one of 
the most memorable and valuable experiences at law school. Once we 
recognise the wide variety of talents needed by competent lawyers, and once 
we stop erecting artificial barriers between the learning of theory and its 
application, it becomes patently obvious that "skills" training is more than just 
an appropriate part of a legal education – it is essential if we are to do the job 
we claim to be doing.103 
Why is it important to find the right balance in our curriculum between 
scholastic and skills training? The university law school, inasmuch as it 
controls the process of the admission of prospective law students, is the first 
gatekeeper of the profession. The role of the legal academic includes control 
over the only training experience common to all members of the legal 
profession: attendance at law school.104 Statistics show that at least half of 
all law graduates in South Africa do not enter the legal profession, or having 
entered it, remain in it.105 Is it possible that at least part of this attrition occurs 
because our law schools are sending fledgling lawyers out into the world 
without any idea of what to expect? 
As Nic Swart made clear at the LLB Summit in 2013, university law schools 
do not currently prepare students to meet the high expectations they are likely 
to encounter in practice. However, we charge tuition, and we certify some 
degree of proficiency at the time of graduation. Therefore we have, I contend, 
accepted the responsibility to prepare our students for their postgraduate 
lives in a meaningful way. A university law school offers a unique opportunity 
to use four or five years106 of concentrated study in an institutional setting to 
provide future lawyers with both the skills and values they need to provide 
essential legal services to the community. 
If the profession is to improve the quality of the services it provides to the 
public, it is necessary for the law schools to recognise that their students must 
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receive the skills needed to put into practice the valuable knowledge and 
analytical abilities they learn in the substantive courses.107 We have an 
obligation to balance the LLB curriculum with courses in professional 
competence, including trial advocacy – courses that expose our students to 
what actually occurs in lawyer-client relationships and in courtrooms. The 
skills our law students would acquire in these skills courses are essential to 
graduating qualified, minimally-competent lawyers whom we can hand over 
to practice to complete their training. Of course, the goal is not for law schools 
to turn out expert trial lawyers upon graduation – but law graduates who at 
least are able to perform the fundamental advocacy skills needed in the 
courtroom.108 
3 Conclusion 
Law schools are not trade schools. The teaching of technique can never be 
the law school's only goal. The intellectual discipline of law is crucially 
important. There are no other institutions that can assume primary 
responsibility for it. It is still the first reason for the existence of the university 
law school. I am not advocating a plan for legal education that will produce 
mere legal technicians. It is imperative that our graduates be considerably 
more than that. 
As further expounded in Part 2 of this contribution, I do not propose adding 
clinical courses to the LLB curriculum that centre solely on technique or 
performance, with insufficient regard to the intellectual mission of the law 
school. To the extent that university law schools offer clinical skills courses in 
trial advocacy, interviewing, negotiation and client counseling, they must 
incorporate within that teaching a depth and breadth of legal inquiry that is 
consistent with the essence of the university law school mission. An important 
aspect of that intellectual mission requires students to explore and evaluate 
the divergencies between the presumed operation of the law, as expressed 
through legal rhetoric, and the law's "actual" operation in the courts.109 For 
legal education to be relevant it should aim to produce lawyers who are able 
to critically evaluate legal practice in a broad context, and to promote a 
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direction of legal practice, not only to the optimal need of lawyer/client, but 
also towards broader community needs.110 
The academy must provide more than experience and insight: it must nourish 
conscience.111 The LLB curriculum is not designed as a cram course for 
admission to the profession. We are not preparing technocrats for technical 
roles; rather, we are preparing lawyer-professionals for the diffuse and 
complex roles that they bear in our society.112 
At bottom, "professional education" must focus on certain skills with respect 
to which a trained "professional" – the lawyer – can be viewed as an authority. 
Historically, professions have differed from other honourable pursuits such 
as that of the carpenter or bricklayer in that a profession lays claim at least to 
placing public duty ahead of private gain. A profession is expected to enforce 
high standards of conduct, and to teach young members of the calling.113 
Our profession carries public and ethical burdens with its privileges. As a 
profession with a monopoly over the performance of certain legal services, 
we have a special obligation to the consumers of justice to be energetic and 
imaginative in producing the best quality of justice at the lowest possible cost, 
and with a minimum of delay. Lawyers can fulfill that high mission only if they 
are properly trained.114 
On the one hand, it is unrealistic to expect law schools to turn out a fully-
finished product capable of handling any legal task. On the other hand, law 
schools cannot avoid the responsibility that comes with being one of the 
gatekeepers of the profession – the obligation to provide a basic grounding 
in the knowledge and skills that are fundamental to most activities undertaken 
by lawyers. The university law school must help students form the habits and 
skills that will carry over to a lifetime of practice.115 
The academic agenda that the Pretoria Crits have construed, makes clear 
that they care exclusively about intellectual movements in the faculty of 
humanities, and not at all about the activities of the bar and bench. They lack 
any feel whatsoever for the substantive and institutional problems of the legal 
profession.116 The Pretoria Crits do not care to venture beyond the ivy-
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covered walls, they deprecate the practising lawyer and his work, and they 
look for rewards only from within the university.117 This phenomenon would 
not matter as much if it were not for the inescapable fact that the university 
law school is not a department in the faculty of humanities. We are a 
professional school that enrolls hundreds of students each year who are 
overwhelmingly headed for professional life. 
Law students who are taught that theoretical discourse is the be-all and end-
all, and that practitioners are "sell-outs", will be woefully unprepared for legal 
practice. Those students will not understand how to practice law as a 
professional. Law school is where they will begin to define themselves as 
professionals. They will have gained the impression that the practice of law 
is necessarily grubby, materialistic and self-interested, and will not 
understand in any concrete way what professional practice means.118 
Law students need concrete ethical training. They need to understand why 
pro bono work is important, and how to balance a commitment to pro bono 
work with profit-seeking. They need to understand their duties as "officers of 
the court", and how to balance those duties with their duties as "advocates" 
for their clients. In short, law students need to know, before they enter full-
time employment, what ethical practice means. Otherwise, their only model 
of the practicing lawyer may well be crudely materialistic.119 Should the 
Pretoria Crits' glorifying of theory over practice prevail as the dominant model 
for university legal education, many law graduates may set forth each year to 
pursue a livelihood "that they are encouraged to see redeemed only by the 
lucre with which it will line their pockets, at least for a while".120 
I should state clearly that I do not doubt for a moment the importance of theory 
in legal education. This contribution is certainly not a call for the abolition or 
suppression of legal theory. A great professional school can never be anti-
theoretical. We have an obligation to offer our students a broader perspective 
on the world in which lawyers function. Legal doctrine did not develop and 
does not exist in a vacuum. We should discuss theoretical underpinnings and 
broad ethical and normative concepts with our students. The need for an 
understanding of other disciplines – history, psychology, philosophy 
sociology and economics – becomes apparent after even the most cursory 
examination of the range of problems lawyers and judges face on a daily 
basis. It is also crucial for law students to understand and apply theoretical 
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frameworks and philosophical concepts so that their thinking about the legal 
professions is infused with depth and breadth.121 
To the extent that legal theory can help our law graduates prepare for lifelong 
critical reflectiveness about the law, legal institutions, the profession, and 
their own lives in the law, it obviously needs no further justification for its place 
in the LLB curriculum. Even that most realistic of legal realists, Jerome 
Frank,122 said: 
An interest in the practical should not preclude, on the contrary it should invite, 
a lively interest in theory … [T]hose "practical" lawyers who decry legal theory 
as frivolous are, despite themselves, legal theorists, legal philosophers. But 
their philosophies, their theories, are usually inarticulate, so that they delude 
themselves and surrender in practice to their own unexamined, uncriticized 
principles. 
There is, however, a limit to how much a professional school can emphasise 
pure reflectiveness or detached inquiry or intellectualism for its own sake.123 
There is a limit because there is also a cost in terms of the distribution of 
assets and resources. Our students have a great deal to learn, only some of 
which is moral philosophy, feminist jurisprudence and political science. I differ 
with the Pretoria Crits in that I believe theory is a valuable component of a 
pluralist legal education, but it does not merit exaltation to the sublimation or 
exclusion of all other elements of legal pedagogy. 
We cannot allow theory to displace the "professional" content of the law 
school curriculum. A more balanced legal education will fuse thoughtful, 
creative ideas with the ability to implement those ideas in ways that are 
beneficial in practice to individual clients and to society in general. This is 
more in line with the concept of a university law school as envisioned by 
Thomas Jefferson:124 
[A bridge between] the worlds of ideas and affairs, supporting traffic in both 
directions to bring academic thought into contact with reality[,] and practical 
governance into contacts with disinterested inquiry, with benefits flowing in both 
directions. 
We should not produce good technicians with nothing to say any more than 
great thinkers who are unable to translate their thoughts into any kind of 
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usable, concrete form. Our law schools cannot be successful in developing 
only "intellectuals" who are, at the same time, woefully inadequate 
practitioners. An emphasis on clinical courses – which focus less on 
theoretical analysis and more on the process by which a legal result is 
actually accomplished – will reset the scale and represent an 
acknowledgment that it is all right to be a lawyer. 
Therefore, we should train our students not to be "ivory tower dilettantes"125 
in the Pretoria Crits' image, but to be lawyers, to be people of action, to 
understand what lawyers do, how they do it, and how it could be done better. 
Any legal education that focusses exclusively or predominantly on theory is 
deficient: "That is a passive, not an active, education. It is not an education 
for people who are to do".126 Such an education fails in its basic duty of 
providing society with people-oriented and problem-oriented attorneys, 
advocates and advisors.127 To my mind, nothing could be more absurd than 
to neglect in education those practical matters that are necessary for a 
person's future calling. 
I would hope that free and critical inquiry, breadth of perspective, intellectual 
discipline and independence of thought and judgment are the byproducts of 
a university education in general. A university education should do more than 
tax the mind. It should prepare the student to live in, and contribute 
meaningfully to, contemporary society. However, it is not, and cannot be, the 
principal goal of any specific faculty, especially not the professional schools. 
Just as the faculty of engineering trains engineers, and the faculty of health 
sciences trains doctors and dentists, we are teaching law, training lawyers. 
In addition to teaching theory and doctrine, our job is to inculcate in our 
students an appreciation of the day-to-day processes of the law in action in 
their social context. 
The United States legal realist scholar, Karl Llewellyn,128 expressed this goal 
thus: 
[I]f there is be one school in a university of which it should be said that there 
[students] learn to give practical reality, practical effectiveness, to vision and to 
ideals, that school is the school of law. 
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The primary goal of the university law school must be the education of 
professionals capable of good lawyering performance.129 We should, in other 
words, be teaching Pericles to be able to fix a leaky pipe. 
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